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Introduction 
 
 
The Future of the WTO after the Nairobi 
Ministerial Conference 
Evita Schmieg and Bettina Rudloff 
The WTO’s 10th ministerial conference took place shortly before Christmas 2015, the 
first to be held in Africa. Verdicts on its outcomes range from “the death of the Doha 
Round” to WTO Director-General Roberto Azevêdo’s praise for a “historic” package. 
A more measured assessment reveals a mixed picture. While a number of important 
decisions were reached in Nairobi, most of the controversial questions were not even 
on the agenda. And it is less clear than ever where the talks should go from here. A 
consistent and ongoing shared interest in the global public good of a strong world 
trade system should persuade the member-states to find constructive new approaches. 
 
On 19 December 2015, the 164 members 
of the WTO – including the latest new addi-
tions Liberia and Afghanistan – agreed on 
the text of a ministerial declaration. Ad-
vance expectations were rather low, given 
the substantial differences on important 
points between the industrialised countries 
(especially the United States) and the devel-
oping countries. The WTO’s Doha Round 
began in 2001, seeking a further liberalisa-
tion of world trade. Under the impression 
of the events of 11 September 2001, the 
initial meeting explicitly acknowledged 
that world trade needed to function to the 
benefit of all, and consequently placed 
the needs and interests of the developing 
countries at the heart of the talks. Over 
the subsequent years, however, the talks 
dragged on without producing results. The 
first significant success did not come until 
Bali in 2013, with the conclusion of the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement. From the 
different positions, the course of the 
negotiations and the results achieved to 
date, conclusions can be drawn about the 
future of the WTO and whether this insti-
tution will continue to be in a position to 
provide the global public good of an inter-
national world trade system. 
Overdue Decisions on Agriculture 
In the agricultural sector Nairobi succeeded 
in agreeing a handful of changes in line with 
the three pillars of the existing agricultural 
agreement. Although the sector is economi-
cally marginal in the global context, it is 
very important for a number of developing 
countries. Moreover, agricultural trade is 
affected by considerable differences of in-
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terests between developed and developing 
countries. Agricultural negotiations are 
often of great political and strategic impor-
tance for talks on other issues. 
(1) Internal subsidies. The Nairobi decisions 
provide for exceptions for subsidies used to 
build food reserves. At India’s initiative, the 
2013 ministerial conference in Bali adopted 
an interim solution for the subsidisation of 
such reserves. This relativised the strict prin-
ciple that permits agricultural subsidies 
only under specific conditions. Because 
most developed countries make such pay-
ments and were able to notify them for-
mally to the WTO during the 1986–94 
Uruguay Round, only they were in a posi-
tion to fulfil these conditions. India pro-
tested increasingly vigorously against this 
historic injustice and sought a rule change 
to reduce its exploding budget for food 
reserves. But many others, in particular 
developing countries, also feared that 
allowing India subsidies would increase 
Indian exports at the expense of their 
own, or wipe out their own markets. 
Nairobi failed to replace the temporary 
solution with a permanent arrangement. 
Observers assume that the differences may 
be so large as to preclude such a solution, 
with the temporary arrangement instead 
being extended at intervals. 
Unfortunately a general subsidy reduc-
tion and comprehensive reform of the rules 
was not on the agenda, even though sub-
sidies continue to be granted on a grand 
scale by actors such as the United States 
and the European Union, and increasingly 
also by countries like China and India. To 
date the strength of the agricultural lobbies 
has prevented any further reduction in agri-
cultural subsidies. Yet such a move would 
ensure greater fairness and especially ben-
efit poorer countries, which would then 
no longer have to compete with subsidised 
products. 
(2) Deadlines were set for the final expiry 
of export subsidies, with an asymmetrical 
arrangement for industrialised and devel-
oping countries. While the developed coun-
tries must cease export subsidies with 
immediate effect, the developing countries 
have until 2018, and the least developed 
countries and food importers until 2030. 
This step, which was long overdue, was 
made possible by the comparatively high 
recent global market prices, which meant 
that these subsidies are currently rarely 
applied. The timeframe for repaying state-
backed export credits, which are granted on 
a large scale by the United States, was short-
ened, although less strongly for developing 
countries. This at least places a limit on the 
duration of public support. The third type 
of distorting export subsidy, state export com-
panies, is found above all in India and China. 
This type was not negotiated in Nairobi, but 
is a topic in working parties. 
Some observers regard the decisions 
on export subsidies as very important and 
system-transforming, because they finally 
abolish this strongly market-distorting 
instrument. If agreement had not been 
reached, this instrument could have re-
appeared on a larger scale when market 
prices fell again – a scenario that currently 
appears perfectly realistic in light of pres-
ent market developments. The decision can 
also generate political pressure for further 
progress on other agricultural issues. 
Once again, no significant decisions were 
taken on food aid, such as the abolition of 
monetisation of aid to fund development 
projects. The United States in particular 
makes intense use of this possibility and 
wishes to retain it. The better alternative 
of cash aid to support the purchase of local 
products (instead of in-kind aid) was again 
only vaguely recommended. Until these 
reforms occur, counterproductive food aid 
will continue to destroy markets. 
(3) In the area of agricultural tariffs a gen-
eral safeguard mechanism was adopted, 
permitting developing countries to increase 
tariffs in the event of import surges, as they 
have long been demanding. However, con-
cretisation of the decision (scope, timeframe, 
products) was left to the regular WTO Agri-
culture Committee. Although there is already 
a possibility to impose protective tariffs, 
this can be used only by developed coun-
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tries to trigger automatic tariff increases 
for strategic products when a particular 
price level is reached (Special Safeguard 
Mechanism). Nairobi’s acknowledgement of 
an asymmetry to the detriment of the devel-
oping countries must be regarded as a great 
step forward. Whether the decisions will 
actually level the playing field will depend 
on details that remain to be fixed. 
(4) The cotton sector saw substantial pro-
gress only in the rules on export subsidies, 
in line with the general rule changes for 
such subsidies. It was agreed that developed 
countries that felt “in a position to do so” 
could grant duty-free access to cotton ex-
ports from least developed countries (LDCs). 
Differences within the group of developing 
countries prevented a more far-reaching 
agreement specifically for market access for 
the LDCs: major cotton producers like India 
fear the competition created by a signifi-
cant market opening. 
From the perspective of the developing 
countries the achievements were modest. 
Although the 2005 meeting in Hong Kong 
decided to prioritise problems in the cotton 
sector, there were no decisions on resolving 
the pressing problem of trade-distorting 
production subsidies. In 2014 the United 
States alone granted subsidies totalling 
more than $500 billion in the cotton sector. 
That represents about one quarter of the 
$1.8 billion that the “Cotton Four” coun-
tries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Chad), as 
the biggest LDC exporters, together earned 
from their exports in the same year. China 
and India also contribute to distortions in 
the world cotton market, even if they pro-
cess almost all the cotton they produce 
themselves. The Cotton Four countries are 
strongly dependent on cotton exports and 
suffer especially from the distortions of the 
world market. 
Measures Benefiting the 
Poorest Countries 
The Nairobi declaration repeats the promise 
of Doha, to secure for the developing coun-
tries, and especially the LDCs, a share of 
world trade corresponding to their develop-
ment needs. According to the WTO (Briefing 
Note LDC) the LDCs contain 12 percent of 
the world’s population, produce less than 
2 percent of global GDP and are responsible 
for only about 1 percent of world trade in 
goods. Options for improving the trade 
position of the LDCs have been under dis-
cussion since the beginning of the Doha 
Round. Two outcomes were achieved in 
Nairobi: 
(1) Improvements to rules of origin. WTO 
rules permit lower tariffs to be applied to 
imports from LDCs, in order to promote 
their integration into the world economy. 
More developed countries grant these 
preferences unilaterally in the scope of 
their Generalised Systems of Trade Prefer-
ences (GSP). The standardisation and sim-
plification of rules of origin agreed in 
Nairobi is intended to help LDCs to make 
better use of their trade preferences. The 
most important element of the decision 
is the call for member-states to permit a 
cumulation of 75 percent. In other words, 
exports from LDCs should still be granted 
preferences even where up to 75 percent of 
the total value of the inputs are imported 
from countries that are not LDCs. 
Given that value chains in LDCs are 
generally short, this rule is important in 
order to allow a broader range of their 
products to enjoy preferential treatment. 
However, the rule will not come into effect 
until the preference-granting countries 
implement the Nairobi decision in their 
existing national preference schemes. 
(2) The second decision affects services, 
for which LDCs can potentially also enjoy 
preferences. The “waiver” that permits 
these preferences was extended for fifteen 
years, until the end of 2020. One reason for 
this was that few such preferences have ac-
tually been granted to date, and it is hoped 
that greater use will be made of this instru-
ment in future. 
Measured against the low expectations, 
the Nairobi outcomes are certainly positive. 
But they do not represent any great progress 
towards the Doha Round’s development goal 
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of improving the integration of the develop-
ing countries in world trade. 
Duty- and quota-free market access for 
LDCs was not discussed in Nairobi. This 
measure was agreed in 2005 at the Hong 
Kong ministerial conference, but has only 
been implemented in full by the European 
Union, even though it only proposes abol-
ishing tariffs on 97 percent of tariff lines. 
It is the other 3 percent that are decisive, 
because they affect exports of finished 
manufactured goods. The lion’s share of 
LDC exports – primary products – is tariff-
free anyway, because the importing indus-
trialised countries require the inputs for 
their own industry. 
The LDCs had also introduced far-
reaching proposals for the service sector, 
for example for simplifying administrative 
processes for visa applications and work 
and residence permits relating to the ex-
port of services supplied by natural persons 
(“mode 4”). Because they can offer lower 
wage costs, LDCs possess a particular inter-
est in these services. But tied as they are to 
questions of migration (such as residence 
permits), they are also particularly politi-
cally and economically sensitive for the in-
dustrialised countries and emerging econo-
mies. It therefore comes as no surprise that 
no consensus could be achieved on this 
issue. 
Tariff Elimination for Defined 
IT-Products 
Fifty-three members of the WTO agreed in 
Nairobi to expand the Information Tech-
nology Agreement (ITA), which affects trade 
flows worth $1.3 trillion. Concretely, it was 
agreed to abolish tariffs on 201 IT products. 
65 percent will be tariff-free from 1 July 
2016, with the other tariff lines reduced 
incrementally to zero by 2019. As a pluri-
lateral agreement under the auspices of the 
WTO, the ITA was not signed by (and there-
fore not valid for) all WTO members. 
Ways Forward for the WTO 
The Nairobi ministerial declaration explic-
itly lists the mutually contradictory ideas 
of the member-states about how the WTO 
should proceed, breaking for the first time 
with the tradition of adopting only unani-
mously agreed statements. Consensus was 
impossible because the developing coun-
tries would like to complete the Doha 
Round on account of its stated development 
goal, while the industrialised countries 
regard that as hopeless. They believe that a 
new start is required instead, to address the 
pressing issues of the twenty-first century. 
The gap between the two positions is cur-
rently unbridgeable. 
One underlying problem in the talks is 
the UN’s classification of developing coun-
tries, which has an especially strong effect 
on the negotiations on the elimination of 
industrial tariffs. The industrialised coun-
tries expect more advanced emerging 
economies like China, Brazil and India to 
open their markets more strongly, in line 
with their growing share of world trade. 
But in many respects these countries would 
prefer to continue to benefit from the privi-
leges granted to developing countries. In 
return for reducing industrial tariffs they 
demand a further-reaching opening of the 
agricultural sector. The positions are so far 
apart that the question of industrial tariffs 
was not even on the agenda in Nairobi. 
It is completely unclear how the talks 
will proceed after Nairobi, leading certain 
observers to speak of the death of the WTO. 
In fact, there are numerous starting points 
for the WTO to continue working construc-
tively. The central elements are discussed 
in the following sections. 
A Stronger Legal and Administrative 
Framework 
The members of the WTO possess a funda-
mental interest in continuing to develop 
the international system of rules, which 
can be regarded as a public good. 98 per-
cent of world trade is conducted under 
WTO rules. If the negotiations fail to pro-
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duce results, there is a danger that the suc-
cessful dispute settlement system will in-
creasingly be used to clarify disputed points, 
shaping the rules through its verdicts. 
The dispute settlement system itself is a 
success story. It has dealt with more than 
five hundred cases in twenty years, and 
is frequently held up as a model in other 
fields of international politics, because as 
well as resolving trade disputes it also has 
the power to impose sanctions to enforce 
its rulings. It is therefore an important 
element of the “public good” of the WTO. 
The WTO’s everyday routine work, which 
often involves defining and interpreting 
rules and standards outside the glare of 
public attention, offers a reliable frame of 
reference. For example, the WTO organs 
decided in October 2015 to benefit the 
LDCs by extending until the end of 2032 
the transitional period for applying the 
agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) in the field of phar-
maceutical products. That decision was 
then merely formalised in Nairobi. It per-
mits the LDCs to continue cheap produc-
tion of generics without having to pay 
patent licensing fees. For the meantime it 
also spares them the administrative costs of 
introducing and applying the protections 
laid out in TRIPS. So significant decisions 
can certainly be taken in the WTO’s regular 
working processes. 
In view of the continuing success of the 
WTO’s routine work, one group of propo-
sals for reforming the multilateral trade 
system would therefore seek to strengthen 
its committee work and the role of the sec-
retariat. For example the E15 initiative put 
forward by the Geneva-based think-tank 
ICTSD proposes turning the WTO commit-
tees into active platforms for deeper analysis 
and informal dialogue. 
The frequently discussed idea of aban-
doning the necessity to achieve consensus 
over decisions in the WTO, on the other 
hand, appears to be nothing more than a 
fancy. Decisions about trade policy have 
direct economic repercussions on all mem-
ber-states, often enough problematic ones, 
for example when their own production is 
displaced. At the same time, the level of 
political integration within international 
bodies is much too small to allow for major-
ity decisions. It is therefore hard to imagine 
states entertaining such a far-reaching 
relinquishment of sovereignty. For compre-
hensible reasons, the member-states have 
no confidence that majority decisions would 
be to their overall benefit. 
 Without Single Undertaking 
The principle of all GATT negotiating 
rounds, that “nothing is agreed until every-
thing is agreed” (“single undertaking”) has 
been quietly dropped since 2013. Although 
earlier rounds also featured an “early har-
vest”, these outcomes were regarded as pro-
visional until the negotiations as a whole 
had been completed. That no longer applies 
to the Trade Facilitation Agreement con-
cluded in Bali, nor to the Nairobi decisions. 
The “single undertaking” principle is too 
restrictive for today’s complex negotiations. 
It originates from a time when talks were 
exclusively about reducing tariffs in the 
GATT framework. It is easy to calculate the 
consequences of tariff reductions for indi-
vidual member-states, the future export 
opportunities and import increases: in short, 
what each country gains or loses. The prin-
ciple also corresponded to the economic 
theory that all countries would benefit 
from trade liberalisation. To that extent it 
made sense to search for the ideal solution 
until everybody was happy. 
Today the classic tariff negotiation plays 
an increasingly small economic role, if for 
no other reason than the drop in globally 
weighted mean applied tariffs from 34 per-
cent to 3 percent between 1996 and 2012. 
Instead, non-tariff trade barriers and regu-
latory policy gain in importance. And trade 
negotiations are consequently a great deal 
more complicated than they used to be. The 
dropping of the “single undertaking” reflects 
the pragmatic approach pursued since the 
accession of WTO Director-General Azevêdo 
in 2013, which consists in concentrating on 
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the possible and working towards smaller 
packages of results. 
 With Plurilateral/“Club” Solutions 
The success of the ITA expansion demon-
strates that a smaller group of member-
states with a shared agenda can achieve 
a further-reaching liberalisation in areas 
where the membership in its entirety 
would be unable to agree. 
There are two forms of plurilateral agree-
ment: (1) In one the outcomes apply to all 
WTO members under the most-favoured-
nation principle. For example, theoretically 
all WTO members should benefit from the 
tariff reductions on IT products agreed in 
Nairobi. But only in theory, as in this case 
the countries that abstained from the talks 
have nothing to offer in the affected sec-
tors. Plurilateral agreements are therefore 
a double-edged sword. Progress on trade 
liberalisation is welcome, the creation of a 
framework that other countries can join is 
positive, and in some cases arrangements 
become part of comprehensive WTO agree-
ments (this applies, for example, to pro-
visions from the plurilateral bovine meat 
agreement). But in practice there is a danger 
of the gap between participating and non-
participating countries growing (in the case 
of the ITA also a technological gap). (2) In 
the second form of plurilateral agreement 
(example: public procurement) the agreed 
market access arrangements apply only to 
the participating states. While this may 
make agreement easier to reach during the 
talks, here too there is a longer-term danger 
of exacerbating differences between eco-
nomically stronger and weaker countries. 
The fundamental problem with plurilateral 
agreements is that the weaker countries are 
least likely to participate in international 
rule-making. And because the rules do not 
take into account their interests and capac-
ity restrictions, there are also difficulties 
associated with joining later. 
 Taking Level of Development into 
Account in Trade Rules 
The WTO has already developed approaches 
for avoiding these problems. In mid-January 
2016, Director-General Azevêdo described 
“flexibility” in talks on new trade rules as 
an important precondition for achieving 
results. The Trade Facilitation Agreement 
for the first time coordinates the funda-
mental scope and pace of implementation 
with the administrative and financial 
capacities of the developing countries, not 
through exceptions but within the funda-
mental structure of the agreement. At the 
same time it permits poorer countries to 
make implementation conditional on sup-
port in the form of development coopera-
tion. 
Given the great challenges associated 
with implementing regulatory measures, 
this could also become a model for future 
agreements. Implementation not only costs 
money, but also depends on the existence 
of adequate administrative capacities for 
passing laws and regulations, reforming 
institutions and processes, and dialogue 
with the private sector. Although this form 
of agreement involves a danger of reform-
resistant countries foot-dragging on imple-
mentation, it can also enable reform-will-
ing countries to make progress that would 
otherwise be impossible. In its new foreign 
trade strategy of October 2015 the Euro-
pean Union now for the first time includes 
a chapter on implementation of free trade 
agreements, after recognising the existence 
of deficits in this area, where small and 
medium-sized enterprises in particular ex-
perience difficulties in realising the benefits 
offered by trade agreements. For example 
a year after the EU-South Korea free trade 
agreement came into force, only 40 percent 
of European exporters had profited from 
the tariff concessions it grants. This example 
implies that successful implementation of 
agreements will be a great deal more dif-
ficult for poorer countries. 
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 Addressing the Issues of the Twenty-
first Century, in the Interest of All 
Many actors, especially the governments 
of the more developed members, believe 
that the WTO is failing to discuss the press-
ing issues of the twenty-first century. That 
is one reason why interest in bilateral and 
regional trade agreements has grown so 
strongly in recent years. There is certainly a 
need for international discussion on many 
topics, such as digital commerce, aspects 
of sustainability, compatibility of the trade 
system with climate targets, and the devel-
opment of a multilateral framework for 
trade-related investment. 
Countries with weaker administrative 
capacities in particular find it difficult to 
define their negotiating interests on these 
questions and to assess potential impacts. 
That is also one of the main reasons why 
the developing countries have recently 
blocked the introduction of new topics. 
They feared being rushed into outcomes 
that are not in their interests. In fact, it 
would be important for the developing 
countries to play a role in shaping new 
rules by participating actively in negotia-
tions. There are numerous points that 
poorer countries should be asserting in the 
interests of their own development, and that 
could otherwise end up being ignored. When 
foreign direct investment is discussed, for 
example, the investing countries (which are 
today by no means only the industrialised 
countries) prioritise the aspects of invest-
ment protection and profit transfer. Poorer 
countries, on the other hand, are interested 
in restricting the international competition 
to attract investors through subsidies, which 
their meagre state budgets leave them 
unable to win against industrialised coun-
tries. The issue of multinational companies 
using profit transfers for tax avoidance is 
also of great interest. Africa alone loses 
more than $40 billion annually by this 
route, or more than 4 percent of its GDP. 
In this connection it is worth noting that 
the African, Pacific and Caribbean (ACP) 
states did propose discussing one subsidy 
issue in Nairobi – seeking an agreement to 
restrict fishery subsidies. Although full 
discussion of the issue was prevented by 
the resistance of the major fishing nations, 
the example does show that developing 
countries are capable of actively pursuing 
their rule-setting interests in talks. 
 With More Focussed Targets and 
More Leadership 
The climate conference was frequently 
discussed in Nairobi as the yardstick of suc-
cess: agreeing targets at the political level, 
analogously to the 1.5 degree target set in 
Paris. However, that comparison overlooks 
an important difference between the two 
areas. On the climate question, the issue is 
to establish a functioning international 
regime in the first place. At this level, and 
for a global public good, it is easy to formu-
late a general objective such as limiting 
global warming. The world trade system, on 
the other hand, already possesses a sophis-
ticated set of rules defining a firm frame-
work for economic actors and contributing 
to expanding foreign trade and economic 
growth. At this level it is no longer so easy 
to formulate general objectives. Nonethe-
less, one should seek to learn from the cli-
mate successes and draw on new approaches 
for tackling trade talks. 
The issues negotiated at the WTO are so 
complex that many areas are comprehen-
sible to few outside the involved govern-
ment experts and lobby groups. This makes 
it harder to reach decisions at the political 
level. Politicians find themselves dependent 
on the advice of their civil servants, who 
are often guided by specific interests. This 
tends to stand in the way of the trade-offs 
between topics that are necessary to achieve 
results. 
Following the example of the climate 
talks, targets for trade talks could be formu-
lated at the highest political level, rather 
than negotiating particular political issues 
at the technical level. This would generate 
significant political pressure to prevent 
talks from failing. One example of such an 
approach discussed in the press is the ban 
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on subsidising fossil fuels, on which the 
G20 countries spend $452 billion annually; 
coherence with the Paris climate decisions 
demands that these subsidies be reduced. 
Although this would not appear to be a par-
ticularly promising example in view of the 
enormous differences, the approach should 
be tested. However, if such targets are to be 
arrived at, new formats for bringing 
decision-makers together will be needed. 
The willingness of political actors to 
assume leadership in a positive sense will 
certainly be central to the success of future 
talks. Basically, they will have to place 
greater weight on their duty to the general 
good than on their interest in the next 
election result. That would change certain 
decisions, because short-term interests in 
subsidies and protectionism enjoy great 
attention from lobby groups and the media, 
but often run counter to the long-term 
objectives of sustainable development. 
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